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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002467

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EB/ESC/TFS (GGLASS), S/CT (TNAVRATIL),  
EUR/SE, IO/PHO (APEREZ), INL (ANNE CUMMINGS);  
TREASURY FOR RNEWCOMB AND JZARATE;  
NSC FOR GPETERS

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SUBJECT: GERMAN POLICE LIAISON'S TAKE ON TERROR FINANCE AND  
NARCOTICS IN TURKEY

(U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION ROBERT S. DEUTSCH  
FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) & (d).

1. (C) Summary. According to Heinrich Reiser, the German Police Liaison to Turkey, Turkey's Financial Intelligence Unit, MASAK, is not effective. Reiser considers the Turkish National Police (TNP) a much more effective partner in fighting terrorism financing and narcotics. End Summary.

2. (U) On 22 April Econoff met with Reiser, who has acted as Liaison for the past three years. His duties encompass operations, reporting, and technical training and assistance. Reiser noted that, with Turks comprising 5% of the population of Germany, Germany police have long maintained close relations with their Turkish counterparts. He is interested mainly in narcotics, TIP, organized crime, and terrorism. In a wide-ranging conversation, Reiser provided insights drawn from his years of experience working with TNP.

3. (C) According to Reiser, Turkey exports to Europe (mostly Germany) 4-7 tons (comment: presumably, metric tons) of heroin per month, of a value to the exporters of \$5,000 per kilo. Reiser asserted that up to 5% of this amount goes to finance terrorism.

4. (C) While Turkey's narcotics personnel are operationally effective, Reiser does not consider them to be good at gathering and utilizing intelligence, and does not believe that they can put together a complicated case. Cases are based mostly on informers, and little effort is put into reaching higher-ups, in part because of limitations of Turkish law. German training is directed at developing this intelligence capability.

5. (C) Reiser does not believe the PKK to be the primary terrorist threat any more. Of the 50 terrorist organizations that Reiser said are operating in Turkey, he considers DHKP/C to be the most dangerous. (He surmises that DHKP/C is responsible for the April 21 bombing in Istanbul.)

6. (C) Reiser does not believe that much money is laundered through the banking system. Rather, he thinks it is brought into the country in cash (border control is, he says, non-existent) or as goods -- primarily, automobiles and machinery.

7. (C) Reiser called MASAK, the Turkish financial crimes investigation agency, a "paper tiger" and "hopeless." Reiser says it was established only at the insistence of the E.U. and that GOT has no intention of taking effective action to prevent money laundering. Note: Reiser's views, while strongly worded, are not much different from those expressed more diplomatically by a number of post contacts. End note.

8. (U) Reiser works extensively with four TNP departments reporting to a Deputy Director General. The departments are International Relations; Interpol; Intelligence; and KOM. Intelligence handles terrorism (including terrorist financing) and organized crime intelligence gathering. Intelligence hands off to other TNP departments for arrests, and works with State Security Court prosecutors in developing cases. KOM, the Headquarters for Combating Drugs and Organized Crime, has operational responsibility for organized crime, narcotics, cyber crime, and includes a financial police unit (Mali Sube). Reiser considers Istihbarat and Mali Sube to be very good units.

9. (U) The EC has 12 twinning projects with TNP, of which Germany is responsible for 4: (i) Organized crime, which

started last week; (ii) money laundering (with Istihbarat and KOM), to start by year end; (iii) migration/TIP, to start by year end; and (iv) forensics (including terrorism and cyber crime), to start by year end.

110. (C) Echoing comments made by UK's resident customs inspector, Reiser says that mid-level TNP people do not require additional training; rather, efforts should be directed towards supervisors, so that they can appreciate the issues and the work that their subordinates are doing. He also emphasized that providing training (particularly, overseas training) to supervisors is very valuable in developing relationships and that without personal relationships little substantive assistance can be expected from Turkish officials.

EDELMAN